

Risposte a Cappelletto, Lecaldano e Rumore

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Responses to Cappelletto, Lecaldano, and Rumore

Abstract: My interpretation of Book 1 of Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* focuses on the imagination because it gives prominence to the systematic, non-skeptical, naturalist, and fundamental-explanatory character of its philosophy. Chiara Cappelletto is right concerning the impersonal, non-situated character of the Humean imagination. But while this expresses the limitations of Hume's philosophy when it comes to explaining cognitive and affective subjectivity, it is also an implication of his naturalist and empirist orientation. Eugenio Lecaldano objects that I both overextend the imagination and give it a too restricted role. My response is that Hume's imagination is part of a general dualism about the natural mind: perceptions (ideas or passions) and inferences or transitions. At the same time, it has a productive and constructive role across the board, making possible for human nature to engage in cognitive and affective activities, that otherwise would be out of its ken. Finally, I fully endorse Paola Rumore's remarks about the complex connections between philosophy and history of philosophy. As a cross-bread between analytic philosophy and structuralism, I have tried to implement in my book my views concerning historical relevance and philosophical importance.

Keywords: Imagination, Hume, Philosophy of mind.

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