

Identità personale e identità sociale. Commento a *Identità personale* di Eugenio Lecaldano

ANNA ELISABETTA GALEOTTI

Personal Identity and Social Identity

Abstract: I raise two criticisms to the work on *Personal Identity* by Eugenio Lecaldano. The first concerns a general point, namely that in the rich and wide reconstruction of the idea of personal identity in the history of philosophy and, more recently in psychology, sociology, bioethics and so on, there is no place where Lecaldano's thesis about personal identity is directly presented and defended against objections and alternative views. The reader gathers that Lecaldano favors a Humean approach indirectly from the criticisms raised against the traditional view and the Kantian view. The second remark is more specific and concerns Lecaldano position on social identities. He holds that their conventional origin make them disposable to individuals who can thus free themselves from the incapsulation in a specific identity. I counter such position, arguing that the conventional origin does not make them less real to people who are identified from outside with "negative" identity, and that it is not up to minority members to freely opt out of them.

Keywords: Personal identity, Social identity, Majority/minorities, Multiculturalism, Inclusion.

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