

# Responsibility and Its Truthmakers

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*Abstract:* The direct argument for the incompatibility of determinism and responsibility is blocked if one can be responsible for necessary or logical truths. One way to do that, it has been recently argued, is to adopt a truthmaking logic for responsibility I argue instead that the logic of truthmaking alone is not sufficient to deflect the direct argument for incompatibilism, but since responsibility is hyperintensional, and hyperintensionality requires exact truthmaking, it is the logic of exact truthmaking that deflects the direct argument. I go on to sketch a hyperintensional logic for responsibility.

*Keywords:* Responsibility, Determinism, Incompatibilism, Truthmakers.

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