Norma e azione: verso modelli di razionalità normativa

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Norm and Action: In Search of Models of Normative Rationality
Abstract: von Wright remarked (von Wright, 1983) that his work in deontic logic tries to cope with the problem that norms do not have a truth value. In *Norm and Action*, two different and partly conflicting strategies are employed to deal with this problem. The strategy that eventually prevails in von Wright's subsequent works is the appeal to a *model of normative rationality*. Such a model can be construed more or less strictly; making use of some key notions from the later Wittgenstein, I argue that the logical connection between general norms and specific prescriptions displays variable margins of tolerance for disagreement, as well as a constitutive openness to contextual reasons. This leads to a liberal, or a humanistic, conception of normative rationality.

Keywords: Deontic logic, von Wright, Rationality, Normative rationality, Normative statements, Compatibility, Implication, Resilience to disagreement, Reasons, Rule.